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Abstract 1 
Abstract 
This  report presents a model for fault insertion through software; describes i ts  
implementation on a fault-tolerant computer, . FTMP; presents a summary of fault detection, 
identification, and reconfiguration d a t a  collected with software-implemented fault insestion; and 
compares the results to hardware fault insertion data. 
T h e  software-implemented fault insertion model assumes faul ts  manifest as d a t a  errors at 
the output  of a task. T h e  implementation of the software-implemented fault insertion model on 
FTMP allows inserted faults to emulate faults in the processor d a t a  path,  processor control path, 
system memory, and system transmit bus. 
T h e  experimental results show detection time to be a function of time of insertion and 
system workload. For the fault detection time, there is no  correlation between softwareinserted 
faults and hardware-inserted faults; this is because hardware-inserted faults must manifest as 
errors before detection, whereas software-inserted faults immediately exercise the error detection 
mechanisms. 
Fault identification time for FTMP is a function of the system configuration and the fault 
manifestation pattern. The  software-inserted da t a  and the hardware-inserted d a t a  show a 
striking difference, thus portraying the non-unique mapping between the two fault insertion 
methods, but  attesting to  the range of the software fault  library. System reconfiguration times 
are comparable for both hardware- and software-inserted faults. 
In summary, the software-implemented fault insertion is able to be used as an  evaluation 
technique for the fault-handling capabilities of a system in fault detection, identification, and 
recovery. Although the software-inserted faults do  not map directly to hardware-inserted faults, 
experiments indicate software-implemented fault insertion is capable of emulating hardware fault 
insertion, with greater ease and automation. 
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1. Introduction 
Vdidation procedures, such ‘as those proposed in (Carter 86, NASA 79a, NASA 79bj include 
steps to characterize and evaluate the behavior of a system under faulty conditions. T h e  means 
for these evaluations include the following: 
1. Computer Simulation: Computer simulation is used to evaluate the manifestation of 
faults and the system’s response. T h e  simulation models range from the Processor- 
Memory-Switch level through the Instruction-Set-Processor level, the Register- 
Transfer level, the gate level, and to the device level. T h e  drawbacks to simulation 
are the high cost of model development, computational needs, and the difficulty in 
model validation [McCough & Stern 81, Rennels 841. 
2. Physical Fault Insertion: Physical fault insertion places faults in the hardware of a 
realized system. T h e  advantages over computer simulation include speed and fidelity 
to actual system faults. T h e  drawbacks to this method are two fold. First, fault 
insertion requires physical manipulation of components, a time consuming effort [Lala 
& Smith 83aI. Second, the faults are limited to pin level insertion; as realizations 
moves from SSI/MSI to VLSI, the fault insertion level moves from gate level to 
system level. 
This  paper discusses So  ftware-Implemented Fault Insertion, in which the at tempt  is to 
emulate hardware or  physical faults by modifying program data or  control. T h e  motivations for 
software-implemented fault insertion include speed and automation advantages over simulation 
and physical fault insertion; the experimental run time is near, if not the same, as the actual 
system and software-implemented fault insertion does not require any physical manipulation of 
system hardware. Additionally, software-inserted faults are repeatable acrocss architectural and 
implementation boundaries, since the insertion method does not require detailed information of 
hardware implementation. Finally, the gap between pin level fault insertion in VLSI and 
software-implemented faults insertion is narrowing and may be approaching equivalence. 
T h e  literature abounds with prior work demonstrating the benefits of fault insertion and the 
feasibility of software-implemented fault insertion at the architectural or bus level; a sampling of 
I this prior work includes: 
0 Pin-level (gate-level) fault insertion has been used in several evaluations including 
[Decouty e t  al. 80, Finelli 87, Lala & Smith 83a, Lala 831. Observations noted in 
[Lala & Smith 83a, Lala 831 include difficultly caused by incorrect functioning of the 
test module with the test equipment attached. From these fault insertion 
experiments, characterization of fault-handling routines, along with preliminary, but  
inconclusive d a t a  on fault coverage were generated. These experiments 
demonstrate the value of using fault insertion for fault-tolerant system evaluation. 
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0 [Schuette, et  al. 861 inserted transient or soft faults in a MC68000 to evaluate 
software triple-modular redundancy and a signature instruction stream monitor. The  
MC68000 realization does not allow gate-level fault  insertion, hence faults were 
inserted on the address, da ta ,  and control bus lines. This  experiment shows fault  
insertion a t  the bus level can be used to  evaluate fault-tolerance techniques. 
0 The  Sperry UNIVAC 1100/60 [Boone e t  al. 801 has a built-in fault insertion 
capability to verify fault detection, isolation, and recovery mechanisms. This  
capability is activated during system idle time and can insert faults in the processor, 
memory, and 1/0 unit. The  UNIVAC 1100/60 system shows fault-tolerant 
mechanisms can be verified using software control at the system level. 
0 (Yang et  al. 851 inserted faults into the iAPX 432 to evaluate software-implemented 
triple-modular redundancy. Faults were inserted by altering bits in the program or 
d a t a  areas of memory using the debugger. The  experiment shows fault insertion may 
be accomplished by altering bits in the memory. 
This  paper is divided into five sections. The  second section gives an  overview of the FTMP 
architecture with emphasis o n  the fault-handling mechanisms. Section 3 describes a model for a 
fault-tolerant system, a model for fault insertion at the architectural level, and the 
implementation of this model on FTMP. Section 4 presents d a t a  from software-implemented 
fault insertion experiments and provides a comparison, where applicable, to similar hardware 
fault insertion experiments. The  last section concludes the paper with an evaluation of software- 
implemented fault insertion techniques. 
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2. FTMP Architecture 
This section presents an architectural description of FTMP, the target machine for t h e  
sortware-implerric~rited fault insertion. Four subsections include a general overview, followed by a 
detailed description of fault detection, fault identification, and fault  recovery mechanisms 
2.1 General Overview 
T h e  Fault-Tolerant Multiprocessor, FTMP, is a hardware-redundant multiprocessor 
designed for ultrareliable avionic environments [Hopkins et al. 78, Smith & Lala 83, Lala & 
Smith 83b). T h e  architecture, as seen by the programmer, consists of three virtual processors 
with local memory, connected via a common bus to global memory and 1 / 0  ports. Reliability is 
attained through hardware redundancy; each virtual processor consists of a processor triad. The  
memory and buses are also triplicated. Spare processors, memories and buses shadow (i.e. 
execute the same code as) the active units, but  d o  not participate in voting. Each triad executes 
synchronously and a hardware vote occurs during data transfers. Voting is performed by each 
receiving unit, either a processor or memory, from data transferred over redundant buses. 
T h e  bus structure consists of four sets of serial buses, each quintuply redundant, of which 
three are active at any time. T h e  bus sets are: the Poll Bus, which is the bus arbiter; the 
Transmit Bus, which carries address and d a t a  information from the processor; the Receive Bus, 
which carries d a t a  from global memory or 1 /0  ports to the processors; and the Clock Bus, which 
carries clock signals to each processor to maintain system synchronization. 
FThlP employs a realtime operating system with a basic dispatch period of 40 milliseconds, 
referred to  as R a t e 4  There are two lower rate groups, Rate-3 with a period of 80 milliseconds, 
and Rate-1 with a period of 320 milliseconds. Tasks are assigned to rate groups depending upon 
the task’s execution requirement; most of the system tasks, such as the system configuration 
controller (SCC), a memory checker, status display and self tests are assigned to the lowest rate 
group, Rate-1. 
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2.2 Fault Detection 
T h e  fault detection mechanism for FTMP employs hardware voters residing at the receivers 
o f  each bus set. A disagreement at the voter sets an error latch associated with the bus line in 
error. SCC, running as a Rate-I task, reads the error latches to check for errors and potentially 
faulty units. If an error is detected, the time of the error is stored and the fault identification 
routine is called. A time line of the events occurring in fault detection, identification, and 
reconfiguration is shown in Figure 2-1. 
Fault Error 
Occurs Occurs 
Error 
Detected 
Faulty 
Identified 
System 
Unit Reconfiguration 
Fault - Error Detection 
Latency -- Latency Identification R_econfiguration - -  
< t Time Time z- Fault Detection Time 
Figure 2-1: Time Line of Faul t  Detection, Identification and Reconfiguration 
2.3 Fault Identification 
T h e  goal of fault identification is to determine from the error latch information which unit 
caused the error. Since an error on one bus may be attributed to multiple sources (each unit 
enabled on the bus), the general procedure of the fault identification routines is: 
1. Determine all possible sources of the error from the error latch information. If there 
is more than one source, the bus assignments are switched and the identification 
routine waits till  the next Rate-1 frame for another error to occur. 
2. If another error occurs, i ts  possible sources are identified and intersected with the 
previous possible sources. If the new set is not unique, this s tep is repeated after 
switching bus assignments again. If an error does not occur, a transient fault 
analysis routine assigns demerits to all possible sources. 
T h e  fault identification routine runs as part  of SCC; hence, the identification time will be a 
function of the number of passes needed to identify the faulty unit. 
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2.4 System Reconfiguration 
The system reconfiguration procedure entails the removal of faulty u n i t s  cither by 
aclivating a spare u n i t  or by graceful degradation. These procedures are described as follows: 
1. If there is a spare unit (Processor, Memory, or Bus) and it is shadowing the faulty 
unit, the bus assignments are changed to bring the spare un i t  active and the failed 
unit inactive. 
2. If there is a spare processor or memory and it is shadowing a triad other than the one 
containing the faulty un i t ,  then the spare is brought to shadow the triad with the 
faulty unit, the spare activated and the failed unit deactivated. 
3. Finally if there are no spare processors, the triad is retired with i ts  good processors 
assigned as spares. When memories or buses fail without spares, the triad reduces to 
a duplex. 
The  Rate-4 dispatcher executes the reconfiguration commands from the information 
supplied by the fault identification routine. The  reconfiguration time is defined as the time from 
fault identification to  the execution of the reconfiguration commands. 
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3. Software-Implemented Fault Insertion 
This  section describes a model for a fault-tolerant system, and a model of software- 
T h e  realization of the software- implemented fault insertion for a realtime operating system. 
implemented fault insertion is presented on the example system, FTMP.  
3.1 Fault-Tolerant System Model 
Fault- tolerant systems generally use either hardware or time redundancy to achieve 
reliability. Under each of these schemes, there are confinement regions (hardware or time) which 
localize the corruption caused by a fault. Associated with the region, usually at the boundary, is 
an error detection and fault  isolation mechanism (EDFI) which limits fault propagation and 
detects errors. T h e  EDFI also generates a status report showing the condition of the region or 
system. Figure 3-1 presents a system model, based on confinement regions, where the regions are 
processors, P, memories, 14, and IjO units, interconnected via buses through the EDFI interface. 
. .  
Figure 3-1: Fault-Tolerant System Model 
T h e  goal of software-implemented fault insertion is to force the system to appear faulty by 
exercising one or more of the EDFI interfaces by one of the following means: 
1 .  Immediate activation where the EDFI is esercised by an error at the boundary of a 
3. Latent activation where faults are seeded within the confinement regions. 
confinement region, or 
A comparison between software fault insertion and hardware fault insertion includes: 
0 T h e  goal of both fault insertion schemes is to exercise and evaluate the fault-handling 
mechanisms of the system. 
0 Software-inserted faults are inserted a t  the architectural (or programmers) level, 
several levels removed from the generation of true physical faults, but  it is the level 
at. wliich the system architect considered faults and errors. 
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0 Fault propagation, the spreading of adverse physical phenomena [Laprie 851, is 
constrained within the fault containment regions, and would be tested by: failure 
modes and effects analysis, low level physical fault insertion, and simulation. 
0 Error propagation, the spreading of errors within the system (Laprie 851, is the 
primary area which software-inserted faults can be utilized in system evaluation. 
0 Software-implemented fault insertion is analogous to functional level testing of 
hardware or software, which has been shown feasible in the literature (Howdeo 
80, Lai 791. 
0 The  set  of faults at the architectural level is more manageable, reduced in size and 
complexity, than the set  of gate level or functional faults. 
0 Software-inserted faults may be better in triggering a specific response (such as a 
malicious liar), which is difficult to generate or reproduce with physical fault 
insertion. 
0 For some desired errors, physical fault insertion may be the easiest method to 
generate these errors. 
0 Physical fault insertion may be more analogous to actual faults generated in the 
system. 
3.2 System Task Model 
A model for a computational task is shown in Figure 3-2a. Data  (sensors) are read at the 
s ta r t  of the task, operations are performed on the data ,  and the results are written (to 
actuators). A fault occurring in the task would manifest as an error in the output  of the results. 
These errors include incorrect data ,  no data ,  or late data.  Hence faults in the t a s k  could be 
modeled as an error in the oQtput  part  of the task ,  Figure 3-2b. Realtime execution could be 
modeled as a series of computational tasks  with the dispatcher, D, executing between the tasks 
as shown in Figure 3-2c. Adjusting the task model to fit the multiple execution rates of FTMP 
let L be a lower rate task,  where L is all the non Rate-4 tasks' concatenated together to  form a 
single task. The  L task executes a t  the end of the Rate-4 tasks and is interrupted by the s tar t  of 
the next Rate-4 frame, Figure 3-3; thus, the amount of execution time per Rate-4 frame for the 
L task depends on the Rate-4 frame size and the execution times of the Rate-4 task and 
dispatcher. 
'The lower rate tasks include a clock update, System Configuration Controller (SCC), memory checker. 
and status display which execute at 3.125 Hz, one-eighth of the R a t e l  tasks. 
f 
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Figure 3-2: Computational Task Model 
D TaskR41 D TaskLO 
Rate-4 Frame 
D TaskR42 D TaskL1  D . . . 
Figure 3-3: Lower Rate  Task Execution Model 
3.3 Software-Implemented Fault Insertion Realization 
T h e  desired abilities of software-implemented fault insertion or of any fault insertion in 
general are the following: 
Location of Fault:  Insertion of faults should be able to model true faults which can 
occur throughout the system hardware. 
Timing of Faults: A fault may occur throughout any execution task of the system'; a 
fault insertion environment should allow similar conditions. 
Duration of Faults: Faults are classified as either transient, intermittent, or 
permanent [Siewiorek & Swarz 821; the fault insertion should allow the duration of 
inserted faults t o  vary accordingly. 
T h e  realization of the software-implemented fault insertion in FTMP is unfortunately limited by 
the controllability of hardware by the software programmer. Other  highly reliable systems 
should provide the necessary "hooks " for fault insertion and fault monitoring [Decouty e t  al. 80). 
3.3.1 Location and Generation of Faults 
T h e  fault insertion environment must be able to insert or emulate faults in different 
locations. T h e  software-implemented fault insertion environment presently allows faults in four 
regions; these regions and the means which the faults are inserted are described as follows: 
Implemen tation 
0 Processor Data Path Faults: Faults occurring in the d a t a  path may manifest as a 
number of different error types. These include transmission of incorrect data,  no d a t a  
or late data .  T h e  software-implemented fault insertion environment assumes 
processor d a t a  path faults manifest as incorrect data being transmitted by the 
processor, causing an error on the transmit bus assigned to the processor. T h e  
incorrect d a t a  is a single word and the processor s t a t e  remains good after the 
transmission of the bad data .  This  fault class assumes tha t  faults which corrupt 
multiple words would be detected easier than the single word fault. This  generality 
of this fault  class does not limit its application to FTMP. 
0 Processor Control Path Faults: Faults within the control path may manifest to 
many different error types. These include no data transmitted, early or late d a t a  
transmitted,  or incorrect d a t a  transmitted. T h e  software-implemented fault insertion 
environment emulates faults within this region by having the processor execute an 
infinite loop, resulting in no transmission of data .  This  causes errors on two of the 
buses to which the processor is assigned: the poll bus because the processor never 
requests the bus, and the transmit bus because no d a t a  is transmitted. Similar 
emulations of control faults can be used on other systems. 
0 System Bus Faults: Faults on a bus may be attr ibuted to many sources, such as 
noise or a unit transmitting o u t  of protocol. Software-implemented fault insertion 
emulates bus faults by having a processor transmit bad d a t a  on a specific bus. 
Although the processors are generating the errors, the errors map  to a particular bus. 
10 
0 Global Memory Faults: Memory faults may be attr ibuted to decaying bits, stuck-at 
bits, or incorrect address decoding. Memory faults are emulated by writing bad d a t a  
into one memory module of a triad, and then performing a read of the location. 
These type faults are the most general type and can be emulated within other 
systems. 
A few comments on the fault insertion are in order. First, all inserted faults cause an 
immediate error; there is no latency between insertion and error occurrence. The  present 
implementation does not exclude latent faults from further additions. Second, t h e  faults are 
transient and cause no change in processor s ta te  or corruption of data ,  except for the control 
path fault.- Although this is a simplistic model, this is a minimum fault. A faulty processor, or 
one with a corrupted s ta te  will (most likely) have a stream of incorrect data 
r )  
2The memory fault  is also transient; once the data is changed and read, the memory word is written 
over. 
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3.3.2 Timing of Faults 
Faults may occur at any time within the execution of a program. T h e  model a s u m e s  faults 
manifest as errors in the output  portion of the task. T h e  implementation of software- 
implemented fault insertion allows faults to .be generated in the output  of Rate-4 application 
tasks. T h e  occurrence of a fault is specified to a particular Rate-4 frame, but  not to the time 
within the frame. Furthermore, faults may only occur in Rate-4 application tasks and not 
within the dispatcher or lower rate tasks. This  limits the insertion time of the faults to specific 
tasks. 
For  FTMP and other hardware-redundant systems, a fault occurring within a task, such as 
the dispatcher or the fault-handling routines, would be limited to one of the fault confinement 
regions. T h e  occurring fault would thus, have no effect on the correct functioning of the other 
redundant  processor^.^ Additionally the error detection mechanism for FTMP cannot distinguish 
the insertion time o r  location to a specific task. 
3.3.3 Duration of Faults 
Faults can be transient (soft), due to a temporary random environmental condition or 
permanent (hard), due to a physical change in the hardware. T h e  software-implemented fault 
insertion environment generates transient faults, and to emulate permanent faults, a transient 
fault is repeatedly inserted in consecutive Rate-4 frames. Thus  a module with a permanent fault 
produces a stream of faulty data ,  which gives the appearance of a permanent fault when viewed 
from the error detection and identification mechanisms. 
3.3.4 Workload 
A system’s workload is its set  of inputs received from its environment; a desirable feature 
within any computer evaluation environment is a controllable workload. [Feather e t  al. 
85) developed a synthetic workload4 generator for FTMP which has been modified to include the 
software-implemented fault insertion. T h e  synthetic workload provides a means of specificing 
the following factors: 
3This assumes only single faults, and the absence of simplex data or control. 
4A synthetic workload exercises a computer system by modeling its natural workload with generic 
inputs and tasks. 
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0 System Configuration, which defines the number of processor triads and spares. 
0 Number of Tasks for each rate group, and the inclusion of the system tasks, such as 
0 Workload for each task, which includes the amount of 1/0 and computations per 
SCC and Sta tus  Display. 
task. 
3.3.5 Recovery Mechanism 
To gather a large data base of fault insertion data, a recovery mechanism must augment the 
software-impleme'nted fault insertion environment. Draper Labs modified the system 
configuration controller to repair and activate processor 3 before fault i n ~ e r t i o n . ~  This  repair 
code was modified allowing for the repair and activation of the last unit failed (processor, 
memory, or bus), before each fault insertion. 
3.4 Experimental Environment 
T h e  experimental environment for software-implemented fault insertion can be divided into 
I three sections: the experimental set-up and selection of parameters, the execution of the 
experiment and the collection of data ,  and the analysis of data. This  section describes these 
areas of the FTMP implementation. 
3.4.1 Parameters 
T h e  first phase of the experimental procedure is experimental setup and selection of 
parameters. A program queries the user on the selection of the parameters, and from the inputs, 
generates a command file which properly configures FTMP and collects data .  T h e  controllable 
parameters include : 
0 Workload: T h e  system workload includes the amount and distribution of tasks 
between the rate groups, the amount of 1 /0  and computation executed by each task, 
the inclusion of system tasks, and the overall system configuration. 
0 Location: T h e  different locations for fault insertions are described in Section 3.3.1. 
0 Timing: T h e  time of fau l t  insertion is controlled by the Rate-4 frame, hence a 40 
millisecond resolution. 
0 Duration: Either a transient (single) fault or a permanent (repeated) fault may be 
inserted, as described in Section 3.3.3. 
0 Data  Collected: T h e  d a t a  which may be collected includes: the application tasks' 
execution time; the fault insertion, detection, identification, and reconfiguration time; 
the identification of the failed unit; and the reason code for the failure. 
'Draper's fault insertion environment inserted faults in Processor 3; before a fault was inserted, the 
software assured Processor 3 was active in a triad. 
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3.4.2 Experimental Execution 
T h e  second phase of the experimental procedure is insertion of faults and the collection of 
data .  During each experimental loop the following actions occur: 
1. T h e  system repairs any module which failed during the last cycle. 
2. T h e  fault inserter is started and the workload d a t a  collection cycle begins. Workload 
d a t a  (task execution times) are collected for one Rate-1 frame, and the inserted faults 
trigger the fault-handling mechanisms whose execution times are also collected. 
3. T h e  requested data is uploaded to the host VAX and the cycle repeated. 
T h e  cycle time is approximately 30 seconds: one-half is for wait s ta tes  between steps one and 
two, and steps two and three, which may be reduced by passing ready signals. T h e  other half is 
consumed during the uploading of the data ,  which is dependent on the data requested by the 
user. 
3.4.3 Data Analysis 
T h e  third phase of the exp rimental pro edure is d a t a  analysis. T h e  d a t a  analysis program 
takes the absolute timer values collected from FTMP and records differences between two events 
as requested by the user. T h e  average, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, and a 
histogram of the d a t a  are then printed. 
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I 4. Experiments 
With tJic Sol‘t~~src-liii~~lcriit.ii~c~rl Fault  lnsertioii Environrnciit iiiiplerneiited, the next s tep 
was to run experiments evaluating the feasibility of software-implemented fault insertion, and 
the capabilities of the environment. T h e  experiments exercised most of the parameters available 
in the software-implemented fault insertion environment. In particular the location of the fault, 
time of insertion, and system configuration were the primary parameters varied. T h e  collection 
of d a t a  from these experiments involves a measurement of the system workload and the times of 
fault insertion, fault detection, identification, and system reconfiguration. Additionally, the unit 
which failed and the reason code for the failure were stored for analysis of incorrectly diagnosed 
faults. This  section details the experiments performed. Comparisons to hardware fault insertion 
results [Lala & Smith 83a, Wimmergren 831 are made where appropriate. 
4.1 Summary of Draper’s Fault Insertion Data 
Draper, unde r  contract to h’AS.4, completed extensive hardware fau l t  insertion experiments 
at the pin (gate) level (Lala & Smith 83a]. Wmmergren  [Wimmergren 821 also performed fault 
insertion experiments on F T M P  for his Master’s research; his results are compared when 
appropriate. with the same assumptions as Draper’s da t a .  This  section summarizes their 
experiments and presents a comparison between Draper’s hardware-implemented fault insertion 
and the software-implemented fault insertion experiments. 
Draper’s esperiments inserted faults at the pin level of the processor; the types of faults 
were single stuck-at zero, st.uck-at one, or inverted. T h e  d a t a  is divided by the fault location, 
where the locations are cards i n  the LRU’s. For each card, several chips were pulled and faults 
inserted on each of the chips. For our comparison, Draper’s d a t a  from four different cards were 
taken: the CPU d a t a  path card (CPUD), the CPU control path card (CPUC), the  bus interface 
transmit card (BIT), and the cache controller card (CC). These correspond to the software- 
implemented fault insertion locations of d a t a  path,  control path, transmit bus, and data path 
respectively; Figure 4-1 diagrams a hypothesized mapping between hardware and software- 
inserted faults. 
6 
GAn LRU is a Line Replaceable LTriit; each is identical and contains a processor, memory and the 
necessary bus interface circuitry. 
~ 
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T h e  parameters for Draper’s d a - a  were many times unspecific; therefore, for the purpose of 
comparison to the software-inserted faults, some assumption were made: 
0 T h e  time of fault insertion was random for Draper’s da t a ,  whereas with the software- 
implemented fault insertion, the insertion time was specified to the output  portion of 
a Rate-4 task. 
0 T h e  system workload was unknown, but we will assume a light workload with the 
Rate-4 frame size at 40 milliseconds for Draper’s data .  T h e  workload for the 
software-insertion was one Rate-4 task, one Rate-3 (timer) task, and three Rate-1 
tasks (display, SCC, and Readall), and the Rate-4 frame size was stretched to 50 
milliseconds; hence the Rate-1 frame size was 400 milliseconds.’ T h e  difference in 
frame sizes for the two insertion methods should increase the time measurements for 
the software-inserted faults by approximately 25% in comparison to the hardware 
fault insertion measurements. 
0 While the system configuration for Draper’s d a t a  was unknown, a reasonable 
assumption is tha t  three triads were executing with either zero or one spare 
processor. T h e  software d a t a  lists the configuration either as two or three triads 
without spare, or two triads with a spare. 
D raper’s Hardware 
Faul t In ie c tion Location 
CPU Data Path Card 
CPU Control Path Card 
Cache Controller Card 
Bus Interface: T-Bus Card 
~~ 
Possible Fault 
Manifestations 
Bad Data from Processor 
No Data from Processor 
Processor Hangs 
No Data from Processor 
Bad Data from Processor 
Processor Hangs 
No Data from Processor 
Bad Data from Processor 
Bad Data on Bus 
No Data on Bus 
Software Fault Insertion 
Comparison Locatioa 
Data Path 
Control Path 
Control Path 
Control Path 
Data Path 
Control Path 
Control Path 
Data Path 
T-BUS 
T-BUS 
Figure 4-1: Possible Fault Mapping Between Hardware- and Software-Inserted 
Faults 
7The frame sized was stretched by the operating system to allow for the higher workload. 
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4.2 Fault Detection Time 
Fault  detection time is the time from the insertion of a fault until an error is detected by 
the system. For software-inserted fault, the insertion time is at the end of a specified task, 
whereas with Draper’s hardware-inserted faults, the insertion times are any point within the 
frame. Hence the 
detection time for software-inserted faults should be a maximum of one Rate-1 frame (400 
milliseconds), the latency in reading the error latches. For hardware-inserted faults the detection 
time will include the manifestation of the fault as an error, along with the delay in reading the 
error latch, tha t  is, fault latency plus error detection latency. 
Error detection, reading of the error latches, is done by SCC a t  Rate-1. 
In predicting the detection time for software-inserted faults, the following parameters 
affecting the detection time are proposed: 
0 Workload: A large workload stretches the frame size, placing the detection point 
later in the frame. Likewise, a large workload limits the execution time per Rate-4 
frame of the lower rate tasks (e.g. error detection). The  workload function is 
expressed by R4task, the Rate-4 task size, and R4Frs i ze ,  the Rate-4 frame mize, 
both measured in milliseconds. 
0 Time of error detection: The  point at which error detection occurs within the 
realtime cycle affects the error detection latency. This time within the realtime 
Rate-1 cycle is determined by the amount of time which the lower rate  task executes 
before the error detection routine is run. This  time is represented as LDet and is 
measured in milliseconds. 
0 Time of Insertion: The  of point of fault insertion within the realtime cycle in 
conjunction with the time of error detection governs the fault detection latency. T h e  
time of insertion is represented as Tin and measured in Rate-4 frames. 
Finally, let: L x T i m e  be defined as the amount of time tha t  the lower rate  tasks execute per 
frame, where LzTime=max  (R4FrmSire-R4Task ,10)  milliseconds, where 10 millisecond is 
the amount of time the dispatcher will allow for the execution of lower rate  tasks. The  error 
detection time can be represented by: 
LDe t  
L x T i m e  
D e t T i m e  = R 4 F r m S i z e  X [[( ) - Tin] mod 81 
~~ 
The quotient in Equation (4.1) marks the Rate-4 frame in which the error detection task runs; 
the modulo 8 term comes from the realtime cycle of F T M P  (eight Rate-4 frames per Rate-1 
frames). 
Equation (4.1) is plotted in Figure 4-2 as error detection time versus frame of insertion for 
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different workloads; two experimental runs of software-inserted faults are also plotted. In Figure 
4-2, one Rate-] cycle, consisting of eight Rate-4 frames, is plotted twice to slio\\i the contiiiuity 
of the error detection time i n  the realtime cycle. T h e  high worklo3d da ta  has a Rate-4 frame 
size of 50 milliseconds and the low workload d a t a  a 40 millisecond friulle size. In comparing the 
d a t a  of Figure 4-2, the experimental d a t a  corresponds closely to the computed data.  T h e  reason 
for the multiple d a t a  points for each insertion time is tha t  error detection can be accelerated or 
delayed one Rate-4 frame cycle, due to the run time task allocation of FTMP. T h e  increase in 
the slope as the workload increases is due to the lengthening of the basic frame size, hence 
placing the error detection a further time away from the fault insertion. 
500 1 a\ 
Detect.ion Time 
DEtTinie 
t 
Experimental High Workload 
n Experimental Low Workload 
-Equation 4.1, High Workload 
- -Equation 4.1, Low Workload 
100 -4 ;-. 
3 D 
B 
0 
0 I I I I I 
0 2 4 6 0 2 
Fault Insertion Time, Titi 
(Frame Number) 
Figure 4-2: Error Detection Time as a Function of Insertion Time 
Figure 4-3 shows histograms for the fault detection time with the time of fault insertion 
varying between graphs. T h e  fault location is the d a t a  path, but  this d a t a  is representative of 
the other fault locations. T h e  time skewing between the graphs shoivs the lengthening of the 
detection time as the  fault  insertion time moves relative to the fixed detection time. Figure 4-4 
shows histograms of fault detection time for Draper’s hardware fault, insertion data .  The  
detection t ime is approximately two times larger than the software-inserted faults. The  
difference is due to the manifestation time of faults as errors, wliereas with software-inserted 
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the delay in fault manifestation contribute to the apparently more random distribution of the 
data .  
10 
From the fault detection time measurements, the parameters affecting the fault detection 
time were shown. Also achieved was the characterization of the process from the error 
I occurrence (error latch set)  to the error detection (error latch read), but  not the events from fault 
occurrence to error occurrence (Figure 2-1). 
of Occurence - 
I I r r I 1 r I , , , , , L a  , 
r mu11 Detection nnr 
Fault lnsrrlcd In R a m  0 2 4 100 poinu 
Percent 
?O - Frequency 15 - 
of Occurence lo - 
5 -  
i 
Percent 
Frequency 
of Occurence 
Figure 4-3: Fault  Detection Time for Software-1nsert.ed Faults 
Experiments 
20 - 
15 - 
10 - 
5 -  
19 
-- Percent 
Frequency 
of Occurence 
30 - 
Percent 25- 
20 - Frequency - 
of Occurence 10 - 
5 
25 30 A 
Fault Deteeuoo nm 
Hudrva Fruit hkcUon 
CHJC Cud. i701 polnu -m 
n 
Fu~ItDa@cUonTlrm 
Hard- hull  InJeaIon 
C C ~ d ~ p o l n n  
1 
1 
30 - 
25 - 
20 - 
15 - 
10 - 
5 -  
1 1  I 
_ _  
Frequency 30 - 
of Occurence 20 - 
10 - 
0 L I I 2 I I I I I I I 
o !  I I I I I 
Pe rce n t 
Frequency 
of Occurence 
-- I 
50 j-i 
Percent 40 
4.3 Fault Identification Time 
T h e  fault identification time is the time from the detection of an error by the system until 
For both software- and hardware-inserted faults, the the source of the error is identified. 
expected data should be similar; the mechanisms involved are the same (Section 2.3). 
T h e  primary parameter affecting this d a t a  is the manifestation of the fault; if a fault 
manifests as errors on different buses, then the possible sources of the fault is limited. A 
secondary parameter is the number of possible sources for the error. This  is dependent on 
system configuration: the more processors, the more sources of errors. T h a t  is: as faults manifest 
to bus errors, the possible sources are all modules enabled on the bus; as errors on different buses 
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I occur from the same faulty source then the bus error "signature" will map to  fewer modules. 
The  experiments conducted varied the fault locations (manifestation), and the system 
configuration (possible sources). 
I 
The d a t a  should be grouped according to the execution time of the identification routine, 
I 
I which is dependent on the number of suspect units. The  routine runs as a R a t e l  task,  once per 
400 milliseconds, with the d a t a  grouped according to the number of passes. 
Figure 4-5 shows histograms of fault  identification times for the softwareinserted faults. 
The  main feature of the d a t a  is the clustering in the distribution. This  was expected; the 
distribution is in multiples of the Rate-1 frame size, approximately 400 millisecond. Thus  Figure 
4-5 also shows the number of execution cycles required for the identification routines. 
Of interest is the control path fault  with two triads executing; the identification time is 
under 50 milliseconds, hence the source was located without reconfiguring the system. The  
reason for t h i s  is as follows: the control path faul t  sends one processor of the triad into an 
infinite loop. As the other processors continue execution they will transmit on both the poll bus 
and the transmit bus causing errors to occur on each. These two errors are sufficient to 
determine the source and hence the faulty unit is identified without further information. 
At  the other extreme is the transmit bus fault with three triads executing. Here the number 
of error sources is four, the bus and the three processors enabled on the bus. This  should require 
a minimum of two bus swaps to determine the source of the error. In this example three bus 
swaps were required. This  is due to a coding error in the identification routine which does not 
swap buses on all triads. Related to  this coding error was another error uncovered during 
preliminary experimentation. During these experiments, transient faults were inserted, with the 
response monitored at the console. Reconfiguration commands issued by the fault identification 
routine did not swap processor/bus assignments as documented, thus delaying system recovery. 
Figure 4-6 presents histograms of Draper's fault identification time d a t a  for the four 
different cards in the comparison and Wimmergren's general d a t a  of identifications times. The  
major difference between the hardware-inserted faults and the software-inserted fault da t a  is 
that  a significant amount of hardware da t a  points lie in the first bin, 0 to 100 milliseconds, with 
fewer outliers a t  the Rate-1 frame size, 320 and 640 milliseconds. As stated earlier, the fault 
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Figure 4-6: Draper’s and Wimmergren’s Fault  Identification Time 
identification time is a function of the number of suspect units to which the errors can be 
attributed. From analysis of data ,  the hardware-inserted faults manifest as errors on multiple 
buses which can only be attributed to a single unit. 
From the experiments, the fault identification behavior was characterized with both fault 
insertion methods. Hardware-inserted faults manifested mostly as multiple errors, whereas the 
software-inserted faults allowed evaluation under single detected errors. Here software- 
implemented fault insertion showed an advantage over hardware fault insertion by being able to 
trigger specific error types necessary for recovery validation. 
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4.4 System Reconfiguration Time 
T h e  system reconfiguration time is the time from the identification of a faulty unit to the 
time when the unit is removed from the active system. T h e  d a t a  for software-inserted faults 
should be similar to Draper’s hardware-inserted faults. The  primary parameter is the system 
configuration, the presense or  absence of spares. The  d a t a  should show an increase in system 
reconfiguration time when spares are not available. 
Figure 4 7  shows histograms of system reconfiguration times under various system 
configurations and fault locations. With the d a t a  path and control path faults, the failed unit 
was a processor and hence the processor was retired; for the transmit bus fault a bus was marked 
faulty and replaced. T h e  d a t a  show the expected increase in reconfiguration time when no 
spares are available, furthermore the d a t a  is clustered at 45 and 95 milliseconds. This  represents 
the period of the dispatcher which executes the reconfiguration commands. 
Figure 4 8  shows Draper’s system reconfiguration data .  Their d a t a  is similar to the sum of 
the software-inserted fault data .  Draper’s d a t a  lacks the resolution and specification of 
experimental conditions for useful comparisons, but from the two d a t a  sets, i t  is evident 
software-implemented fault insertion can be used to  characterize and evaluate the fault recovery 
procedures of a system. 
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5. Conclusions 
This  paper presented a model for software-implemented fault insertion and its 
implementation on a fault-tolerant computer, FTMP.  Experiments were conducted to compare 
the software-implemented fault insertion to hardware fault insertion in the characterization of 
fault detection, identification, and recovery. From the experiments, the following information 
regarding the two fault insertion methods can be asserted: 
0 Both fault insertion schemes were able to characterize the fault detection, 
identification, and recovery times of the system. 
0 Hardware fault insertion places the fault at a lower level (pin level) than the 
software-insertion (processor level). For this reason, the detection times for the 
hardware-inserted faults included the fault latency times, whereas software- 
implemented fault insertion only included the error detection latency, Figure 2-1. 
0 T h e  fault manifestation and propagation for hardware-inserted faults allows less 
control in the generation of specific error types than the software-inserted faults. 
This  control was available with the software-implemented fault insertion, and was 
useful in discovering a bug in one of the fault-handling routines. 
In summary, although software-implemented fault insertion does not fullp emulate hardware 
fault insertion, i t  provides a means to evaluate the fault detection, identification, and recovery 
means of a system, and in some aspects provides better regulation in generating specific errors in 
the system. T h e  software-implemented fault insertion can also be used for system 
characterization across architectural and implementation boundaries with greater ease and 
automation than hardware fault insertion. Furthermore, as the controllability and observability 
of systems decrease due to the increased use of VLSI technology, software-implemented fault 
insertion may be a reasonable approach to system evaluation. 
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Appendix A. Source Files 
This  appendix lists the source and executable files on the NASA VAX, System 10, which are 
used by the Software-Implemented Fault  Insertion Environment. A brief explanation is given for 
each file listed. 
A.l FTMP Files 
T h e  directory containing the F T M P  AED source files is dlsk$MO : Ccmu . aedl ; these files 
can also be found in dlsk$MO : Cewc . swf I. wrkld. aedl . 
0 swf 1. aed: contains the procedure swf 1 0  which inserts the faults into FTMP 
tasks. 
0 nf scc . aed: is a modified version of the system configuration controller, FSCC, 
capable of repairing any specific Processor, Memory or Bus. 
0 fwrkld44.aed: is the control task which starts the fault insertion and data 
collection cycle. 
0 fwrkld4.aed: contains the Rate-4 FTMP workload tasks; these tasks call the 
swf i 0 procedure. 
0 fwrkld3. aed: contains the Rate-3 FTMP workload tasks. 
0 fwrkldl . aed: contains the Rate-1 FTMP workload tasks. 
0 fwrkld. asm: contains the system memory tables for FTMP. This  file is located in 
the directory dlsk$MO : Ccmu . asm] . 
A.2 Data Collection and Analysis Files 
T h e  directory containing the d a t a  collection and analysis programs for the 
So ftware-Implemented Fault Insertion Environment is dlsk$MO : Cewc . swf 1. wrkld . code]. 
0 wrkld. c, wrkld. exe: generates the command files which configure FTMP for the 
0 anal. c, anal. exe: analyzes the collected data and prints user-requested 
0 btree .c: has the binary tree code used for holding d a t a  during processing by 
0 def lnes . h: contains global definitions for both wrkld. c and anal. c. 
experiment and collect d a t a  from F T M P  during experiment. 
information regarding the data. 
anal. c. btree . c is complied and then linked with anal. c to form anal. exe. 
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whereas software-inserted faults immediately exercise the error detection 
mechanisms . 
an evaluation technique for the fault-handling capabilities of a system in 
fault detection, identification, and recovery. Although the software-inserted 
faults do not map directly to hardware-inserted faults, experiments indicate 
software-implemented fault insertion is capable of emulating hardware fault 
insertion, with greater ease and automation. 
In summary, the software-implemented fault insertion is able to be used as 
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